7.8 The activation of the EPCE feedback reinforces the tendency towards equalization and sufficiency of the rates of profit on capital.

1. Four devices make EPCE feedback more active.

• The normalization of the costing of the rate of profit on capital.
• The reduction of enterprises' self-financing to their depreciation of assets and to the contribution to increases in working capital made mandatory by the legislator.
• The indication, also made mandatory, in the announcement and service of a dividend of its normalized rate.
• The production of statistics and the publication of average rates of profit on capital.

2. Implementing these measures reinforces the tendency towards the equalization of the rates of profit on capital.

Inflows of savings in capital where their rate of returns are highest sooner or later cause these rates of return to fall. Conversely, where the returns on savings in capital are the lowest, let alone zero, conversions and closures sooner or later have the effect of increasing these rate of returns. This convergence is becoming all the more a norm since the competition administration receives from the legislator the task of cracking down on abuses of dominant position.

3. The adequacy of a national average rate of profit on capital varies according to the state of employment.

In a period of growing underemployment, the sufficient level of the national average rate of profit on capital is higher than what it actually is. In a period of decreasing underemployment, the sufficient level is at least equal to what this rate actually is. In periods of structural full employment, the sufficient level is equal to or lower than the effective rate.

4. The activation of the EPCE relationship has the effect that the rates of profit on capital tend to equalize around the sufficient level of their average.

The gravitation of the rates of profit on capital around their sufficient level also participates in the regulation of the prices at which firms sell (more on this point in Chapter 11).