1. The population and the political class of a free country want the income of a large number of adults to be able to be invested onlyPlacement_en_Capital.
These adults are those who are unable or unwilling to provide work in exchange for remuneration while owning assets Patrimoine_Economique that provide them with saving placement income.
2. At the forefront of the conditions under which this collective desire is economically viable is compensation for monetary erosion.
In a country with full EPCE feedback equity investments protect against monetary erosion through the distribution of free shares.
3. Let us call rents by exchange those which a patrimony of value procures, and rents by transfer those which are provided by allowances and pensions by distribution of contributions.
Annuities by transfer have the advantage and disadvantage of not mobilizing an investment patrimony. This is an advantage at the time of their establishment. This is a disadvantage because of the retraining and job creation that require new savings in capital.
4. The social body can adjust the mass of rents by exchange to its needsRente_Par_Echange.
Once the full exercise of EPCE feedback is established, the average on investment estates rises above the exchange annuity requirements Rente_Par_Echange during periods of structural underemployment. As full employment approaches, the average yield falls to the level sufficient for the sole satisfaction of the rent needs by exchange. The two refusals mentioned in the following proposal contribute to this.