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Home› Part III - Major economic policy guidelines› Cleaning up the labor market›Economic policy 11.

11. Assume the sharing of total labour income through wage gaps.

In matters of economic exchanges, labor income and “remuneration of labor” denote the same counterpart, the latter understood as including the employer shares so long as there are any231.

  • Between supplier and customer, the normal relations are ones of reciprocal subordination. An employment contract is no exception, provided it respects what an economic exchange truly is232.

It is only in law that the subordination link of the wage-earner to the employer makes wages a subset of labor remunerations. As soon as there is a labor income, there is a wage economically speaking, whatever the name given to that remuneration233. Although, in the case of the labor income of the owner of a sole proprietorship, there is manifestly no subordination of one person to another, whether natural or legal, this income is in reality a cost of that enterprise, including when this owner calls themselves, or is called, a “self-employed worker” or a “sole trader.”

  • Three magnitudes structure labor incomes. This holds in every country and permanently.

One is the median labor remuneration. By the definition of what a median is in statistics, the labor incomes below or equal to the median remuneration are as numerous as those above it. In national and sectoral economic statistics, the difficulties of estimating it do not prevent it from existing.

  • The purchasing power provided by the median labor remuneration is bound to grow. This is one of the points on which a consensus on the wage component of an economic policy must rest.

More broadly, a consensus, both on the wage question and on the other components of an economic policy, is solidly established only when it is grounded in the experimentally verified theorization of the principal distributions of flows that the practice of economic exchanges tends to establish. This is why what follows rests notably on the content of chapter 8234.

  • The rise in the purchasing power of labor remunerations is borne by employers. The dynamics of this rise are, of course, conditional.

To generate the rise in the purchasing power of labor remunerations, a current of technical innovations is needed, broad and continuous enough to raise the average productivity of investments. Admittedly, it is not often the employers as such who are the inventors of these innovations. But it is they who open up outlets for them, through their financial management, including outside the enterprise, as well as throughout the public sector. It is potentially all employers and not only entrepreneurs with, currently, still — be it said in passing — their tendency to suppose, exaggeratedly, that “wealth creation” is the preserve of the market sector — in fact, every paid job takes part in the ceaseless creation of economic exchange value.

  • Another magnitude that structures labor incomes is the minimum labor remuneration. A significant proportion of jobs that, in France today, provide those who hold them with only, or barely more than, the minimum hourly labor remuneration has always existed and will continue to exist.

Once there is growth in the purchasing power of the median labor remuneration denoted C1, the growth in the purchasing power of the minimum labor remuneration called C2 may be lower than, equal to, or higher than C1. Those who hold that full employment is obtained by making C2 lower than C1 have not understood that it is heavily counterproductive totie growth and competitiveness to the casualization of employment and to the reduction of the labor cost235.

  • The third magnitude that structures labor incomes is the series of labor remuneration gaps. Between each labor remuneration and the median remuneration, the gap is negative, zero, or positive.

These gaps can be seen in two ways. Either they are regarded as the consequence of an economic law common to the formation of all prices, making differing labor remunerations as inevitable as the differing dearness of foods, clothing, and housing. In that case, the assumption (the act of taking on), nation by nation, of the sharing of total labor income would be incongruous: the future of attempts to alter this sharing would be that of the sandcastle facing the rising tide, driven by the economic law that would be common to the formation of all prices.

  • Or else the gaps between labor remunerations have a function of their own. This is the thesis maintained here: the specificities of labor incomes make the assumption, by the social body, of the sharing of their total both possible and beneficial.

This possibility and this benefit are nested at the heart of the market economy, that general regime whose acceptability they considerably increase… which does not suit anyone who has decided to hold economic liberalism to be either antisocial, or condemned to be asocial in order to exist fully.

  • What can happen with any employer of more than one wage-earner reveals the existence of a possibility. Both the minimum remuneration and the median remuneration, and the gap between the highest and lowest remunerations, can be modified at any moment, whether or not the weight of the wage bill in the total of the employer’s costs changes.

It is generally once a year that decisions are made to increase, freeze, or reduce labor remunerations (reduce, because there are frequently variable earnings-sharing components on top of the “base wage”). When the decision is the same for all wage-earners, from the least to the most highly paid, the gaps within this wage bill remain unchanged. When the decisions differ by subset of job positions, gaps are modified. Especially viewed over the long and very long term, the possibility of taking on the sharing of the wage bill is beyond doubt.

  • The equalities and inequalities of labor remuneration are distribution keys of the wage bills. The possibility described in the preceding point reveals the existence of a genuine economic law.

Wages are prices whose ratios to one another remain modifiable by the social body. To be sure, these modifications cannot be abrupt, failing which they reduce incentives too quickly or reinforce deterrents too imprudently. But also, the chaining year after year of these modifications makes it possible to pursue the adjustments that will be perceived, collectively, as felicitous and “decent” in matters of equalities and inequalities of labor income. Increasing the distribution of national labor incomes through the modulation of wage gaps is one of the major treatments of “the social question.”

  • The weight of a national wage bill cannot be modified by the public authority. Such a bill being nothing other than the total labor income, its most significant weight is understood relative to the national total of incomes, including those provided by placements.

Whether or not under the heading of an “incomes policy,” attempts to force up this weight all end in failure. Either the forcing is of the nominal level of low wages and, through a general rise in the price level, no lasting increase in purchasing power results; or the forcing is, through regulatory capping, of placement incomes, and the incentive for the acquisition of shares of capital is too weakened for the creation and reconversion of jobs not to be themselves too weakened (with the consequence that the increase in primary purchasing power, the one that incomes provide, is itself slowed, blocked, or reversed into its opposite).

  • Raising the purchasing power of the median labor remuneration is within the reach of every nation. But not within that of its governments, which claim to provide it to the nation, without the nation being able to procure it for itself.

In this great work of civil engineering, the “social model” may become a cause of failure. It suffices for it to be built on economically unsound mechanisms. Then a refounding is required. For the social partners and the public authorities to fully take on the sharing of labor income through the reduction of wage gaps where they are very widely judged indecent does not suffice for this refounding. But it bears on a central point that no sound argument permits treating as if it were subsidiary or beside the point: the distribution of labor incomes by occupational-qualification group. To err about it is all the more formidable in that it results in too much recourse to redistribution, which inflates the public levy to the point of making it stifling.

12) High labor remunerations cut into those below them. Relative to the common acceptance of this truth, the techniques to be used by the social partners and the public authorities are secondary to bringing the whole of civil society to consciously take on the distribution of total labor income through wage gaps, where it judges it beneficial to reduce or increase them236.

The cutting, by high labor remunerations, into the incomes – themselves also from labor – that are below them is not only inevitable but also necessary. But why act as if this cutting did not exist? To do so is to help make it, within a few generations, ever more calamitous, since, from a growing gap between the highest and lowest wages, the victims are necessarily more numerous, far more numerous than the beneficiaries. It is to persist in defending privileges through a denial of reality: whatever one does, high labor remunerations lower the purchasing power of the remunerations below them.

Notes

  1. Every effort deserves a waget, as the saying goes. Literally speaking, this is not true, for two reasons: what is exchanged for a wage is the service provided by an individual by means of the effort they have taken, and not the effort itself. Not all the services an individual takes the trouble to provide are in exchange for a wage and it often happens that it is services of this kind that prove to be the most precious. Between a political economy that neglects these facts and another that explicitly takes them into account, a conceptual rupture is set in motion. Throughout the respective theoretical paths of these two distinct economies, this rupture can only become more pronounced, particularly when it comes to the remunerations that constitute incomes proper. ↩
  2. A “social model” whose pillars are the artifice of the subordination link, the fiction of employer contributions and the progressivity of “compulsory levies” instead of their proportionality to income, can only prove, in the long run, riddled with perverse effects, because it contravenes too much not only elementary economic realities but also the full working-out of political equality through the contribution to common charges “apportioned equally among the citizens according to their means,” the last phrase of Article 13 of the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen of 26 August 1789. When this “equally” is interpreted as meaning “at progressive rates” and not at identical rates for all, the will expressed is that of maintaining or reinforcing the balance of power between the wealthiest and the least wealthy, even at the cost of reinforcing segregations. ↩
  3. Salaries, fees, commissions, royalties, emoluments, wages, sales bonuses, attendance fees, freelance fees, tips, bonuses, payments, pay, stipends, hourly fees. “Fee notes” and “statements,” likewise, are in reality invoices that make up a revenue of which only a part will be allocated to the remuneration of labor. ↩
  4. The principal distributions of flows inherent in the practice of economic exchanges are three in number: the distribution of total income (chapter 8), the distribution of total labor income (chapter 9), and the distribution within enterprises, among the margin-production centers of the same systemic level, of the remuneration of capital and of the costs that are common to them (chapter 11). Inequalities between private wealth holdings vary, in the long run, largely as a function of these three distributions. ↩
  5. Let us add here that estimating a larger gap between the median and minimum labor remuneration would be just: 1) if the scope of the law of supply and demand were as broad as it is traditional to believe; 2) if it were most often by buying at the lowest price and selling at the highest that an enterprise makes itself viable; 3) if the lasting competitiveness of exporting enterprises depended chiefly on the minimum labor remuneration to which these enterprises have access; 4) if lowering the weakest labor remunerations could bring about a recovery of investments; 5) if, in the event of unemployment, the relief designed and managed so as not to become lasting substitutes, and on-the-job training, could not appreciably improve the employability of those who struggle most to be hired. ↩
  6. These techniques must be non-fiscal. What is to be increased is the social body’s mastery of the distribution of the shares of total labor income, as far as needed by abolishing its confiscation by a bureaucracy over which the holders of the highest labor remunerations inevitably end up gaining the upper hand. Redistribution, especially when pushed toward a negative-income-tax scheme, can only have the effect of taking part in this confiscation and of making taxation a tool whose complexity obscures economic relations and reduces the rise of all labor incomes, beginning with the weakest. To try to correct through redistribution what is manifestly badly done in distribution is, economically as much as politically, an infringement of the general interest. ↩
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