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Home› Part II – Political economy propositions› Chapter 7 - Employment›Proposition 7.6
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7.6 The activation of EPCE feedback is a major act of economic policy.

1. In the abbreviation EPCE, the first and last E are the initial of the word Employment79.

The letter P is the initial of Profit, C the initial of capital, with each term defined unequivocally in its respective section.

Figure 7 - EPCE regulator

2. In times of underemployment, the EPCE feedback accelerates the growth of the national capital stock.

The deterioration of employment E has the effect of increasing the average rate of profit on capital P. This increase accelerates the increase in the national stock of capital C. This acceleration itself has the effect of improving the state of employment E.

3. In periods of full employment, the EPCE feedback slows down the growth of the national capital stock.

The approach and the attainment of full employment have the effect of reducing and then stabilizing P. The increase in C tends to slow down. The risk of a deterioration in employment E increases – but this risk decreases if the social body anticipates it by an increase in savings in capital.

4. Successive states of employment have causes other than the more or less good functioning of the EPCE feedback.

The entanglement and variability in space and time of these other causes, however, leave a fatality intact. Full employment follows structural underemployment only by a fairly sharp increase in the national capital stock.

5. Self-funding through retained earnings hinders the full exercise of EPCE feedback.

Self-financing through retained earnings reduces and smooths the rates of profit on capital. However, the latter are systemically more effective detectors than corporate profit rates. This stems from the fact that profit, as defined here is palpated, in the literal and slang sense of this verb, by those who perceive it and who are likely to perceive it.

6. Losses Perte that have been carried forward again are detrimental to the full exercise of EPCE feedback.

When, for an enterprise, the result of the financial year is a loss, de facto the capital has been reduced by the amount of the loss during that financial year. To act as if this were not the case is to distort the figures and, with them, the arbitrations.

7. The lack of a universal standard of profit on capital hinders the full exercise of EPCE feedback.

A market works much better when a universal system of weights and measures applies to the transactions that take place in it. In a market economy, a structural defect persists in the absence of a standard of profit on capital applicable to all enterprises.

8. The introduction of capitalization rate advertising contributes to the full exercise of EPCE feedback.

The publication of capitalization rates introduces more attention to the proportions of capital that finance enterprises. Its introduction, even if it results in a very slow increase in the average capitalization rate, makes the IBD feedback more active.

9. A diversified offering of variable share savings in capital contributes to the full exercise of EPCE feedback.

The abundant investment offer of returnable shares as long as their average rate of return is at the same level as that of negotiable shares increases the national capital stock. In doing so, it contributes to the full exercise of IBD feedback.

10. The taxation of saving placement income and work at different rates hinders the full exercise of EPCE feedback.

For EPCE feedback to work best in a nation , the public must have full control over it . The taxation of saving placement income and labor at different rates erodes this control. It is then elected officials who, under the impetus of pressure groups, manipulate the uses of savings through taxation.

11. The imposition of a tax on the profits of enterprises is incompatible with equality before the taxation of saving placement income and work.

As corporate profits are the economic bases of profits, a tax system that is far too complicated is needed to enable everyone to understand and verify that profits and Wage wages are taxed equally. Better no tax paid by enterprises on their distributed profits and income tax on all profits.

12. The first condition for the full exercise of EPCE feedback is the propagation of one's will.

Nothing in the economic aspirations and rejections of society stands in the way of its acceptance of EPCE feedback. It remains to be proposed an economic policy aimed at the full exercise of this feedback, with explanations to support it.

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